Entrepreneurship in the Informal Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean: A conceptual model of the finance-performance nexus by Morgan, Horatio M.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Entrepreneurship in the Informal
Economy of Latin America and the
Caribbean: A conceptual model of the
finance-performance nexus
Horatio M. Morgan
Ryerson University
19. August 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49856/
MPRA Paper No. 49856, posted 17. September 2013 02:35 UTC
1 
 
Entrepreneurship in the Informal Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean: A 
conceptual model of the finance-performance nexus 
 
Horatio M. Morgan, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor, Global Management Studies Department  
Ted Rogers School of Management 
Ryerson University 
350 Victoria Street 
Toronto, Ontario 
Canada, M5B 2K3 
E-mail: horatio.morgan@ryerson.ca 
Telephone: +1(416) 979-5000 ext. 2526 
Fax: +1(416) 979-5266 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Entrepreneurship in the Informal Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean: A 
conceptual model of the finance-performance nexus 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Although the size of the informal economy is relatively large across Latin America and 
the Caribbean, it is not completely understood how deficiencies in the institutional environment 
may be related either to the propensity for entrepreneurship or the performance of entrepreneurs 
in the informal economy. Focusing on institutional heterogeneity, this paper characterizes 
external finance (i.e. local family-based equity, remittances, bank credit, business angel finance 
and venture capital) in terms of (1) the mix of finance, business consulting and contacts, (2) 
governance mechanisms (i.e. reputational capital versus formal contracts) and (3) fungibility (i.e. 
discretion to use funds borrowed or received for alternative purposes); and develop a number of 
propositions. The outcome is a finance-performance nexus that provides a basis for a 
theoretically grounded empirical investigation of the relationship between the financial aspects 
of the institutional environment and both the propensity for entrepreneurship and the 
performance of entrepreneurs in the informal economy.  
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Entrepreneurship in the Informal Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean: A 
conceptual model of the finance-performance nexus 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in entrepreneurship in the informal 
economy. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the informal economy, as defined by a 
variety of economic activities that are undertaken outside formal institutions, accounts for almost 
40 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in the case of Brazil, and above 60 of the GNP of 
less developed LAC countries (Schneider, 2002). Among the variety of economic problems that 
are associated with the informal economy are its potentially adverse effects on labor productivity 
growth and the material well-being of society.  
Concerns about the relative size of the informal economy along this line seem to be 
warranted in the context of LAC, where uniformly negative labor productivity growth has been 
observed in the manufacturing sector (Francis, Saliola and Seker, 2013). This dismal 
productivity performance places LAC well behind other regions at a similar stage of economic 
development (i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific 
region). Yet, effective policy intervention is hampered by a limited understanding of either the 
determinants of the propensity for entrepreneurship in the informal economy, or the factors that 
account for performance differences across entrepreneurs in the informal economy.  
The primary objective of this paper is to conceptualize how qualitative differences in the 
external finance accessed by entrepreneurs may not only be related to the propensity for 
entrepreneurship in the informal economy, but may also explain performance differences across 
entrepreneurs in the informal economy. At this embryonic stage in the literature on 
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entrepreneurship in the informal economy, scholars are just beginning to develop the theoretical 
framework that is required to motivate and support empirical work. By focusing on the potential 
link between finance and performance in the informal economy, this paper not only seeks to 
place the emerging entrepreneurship research agenda on a firm theoretical foundation, but to also 
enhance its policy relevance.  
In general terms, the theoretical framework that is developed in this paper is broadly 
informed by institutional theory (North, 1986, 1990, 1994). According to this theoretical 
perspective, individuals (“players”) are assumed to be responsive to incentives, and the latter are 
shaped by both formal and informal institutions (“rules of the game”) in the economic, political 
and social spheres of life. Thus, both behavior and performance differences may be explained in 
terms of existing institutions and institutional differences in one form or another. 
More specifically, this paper is most related to the work of Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi and 
Ireland (2013). Institutional theory has a similarly central place in the relatively broad theoretical 
framework that they develop to support the emerging research agenda on entrepreneurship in the 
informal economy. Specifically, they articulate several propositions that link the propensity for 
entrepreneurship in the informal economy to a variety of institutional factors including the 
stringency of policies, the degree to which policy changes are radical, bureaucracy, conflicting 
interests within decentralized institutions, social capital or trust, and regulatory costs, among 
others.  
The view that institutional factors may encourage enterprising individuals to favor the 
informal economy over the formal one is consistent with other accounts that recognize the 
distortive effects of burdensome regulations (Djankov, McLeish, Ramalho, La Porta, Lopez De 
Silanes and Shleifer, 2002; Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2006; Loayza, Oviedo and Serven, 2006; 
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Van Stel, Storey and Thurik, 2007), weak governance (i.e. burdensome bureaucracy and 
corruption) (Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobaton, 1998, 1999; Friedman, Johnson, Kauffmann 
and Zoido- Lobaton, 2000) and relatively high marginal income tax rates among the top earners 
in progressive tax systems with weak tax auditing capabilities (Cebulla, 1997). 
From the propositions in Webb et al. (2013), scholars have a solid theoretical platform 
that facilitates a theoretically grounded empirical evaluation of the institutional determinants of 
the propensity for entrepreneurship in the informal economy. Still, while a sound understanding 
of such institutional factors is important for policy interventions aimed at containing informality, 
it may not be sufficient to meet the formidable challenge of pervasive informality coupled with 
multiple institutional deficiencies in LAC countries. Thus, an entrepreneurship research agenda 
that primarily generates a list of institutional impediments to entrepreneurship in the formal 
economy may not sufficiently simplify the analytical challenge faced by scholars and 
policymakers alike. In addition, it may not go far enough in providing the latter with clear 
directions on the nature of the most pressing institutional reforms that are required. 
Importantly, the issue of informality is a multi-dimensional one that poses a range of 
difficult, but interesting questions for both scholars and policymakers. Since it is economically 
and socially desirable to restrict the relative size of the informal economy, it is not surprising that 
scholars and policymakers want to better understand how institutional factors may encourage 
enterprising individuals to identify and exploit opportunities in the informal economy. However, 
it is not only the number of working-age individuals or potential taxpayers in the informal 
economy that should concern policymakers; also important is the fact that they may be using 
relatively scarce resources unproductively.  
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This performance aspect of the informality problem has received virtually no attention in 
the emerging theoretical framework on entrepreneurship in the informal economy (Webb et al., 
2013). Yet, it has the potential to complicate both the conceptualization of entrepreneurship in 
the informal economy and the formulation of public policy interventions. For instance, there may 
be similarly institutionally deficient developing countries with not only similar shares of 
informal economic activities, but also similar rates of new business formation in the informal 
economy; yet, these countries may differ in terms of the survival rates and productivity of new 
firms in the informal economy.   
An interesting question in this hypothetical case is: why are some entrepreneurs in the 
informal economy more productive or more likely to survive than others? More generally, 
scholars and policymakers may incompletely understand the institutional factors behind intra- 
and inter-country or –regional differences in the performance of entrepreneurs in the informal 
economy. A sound understanding of what accounts for such performance differences requires an 
explicit characterization of institutional heterogeneity. However, the current theoretical 
framework neither conceptualizes institutional heterogeneity nor addresses the performance 
aspect of entrepreneurship in the informal economy. Thus, there are major gaps in the extant 
theoretical literature. 
This paper attempts to fill these gaps in the extant theoretical literature. Specifically, it 
expands and refines the treatment of the financial aspect of the extant institutional framework in 
the context of LAC. Although it generally recognizes that LAC countries may differ at the macro 
level in terms of economic, social and political institutions, it advances the current theoretical 
literature by explicitly addressing institutional heterogeneity at the micro level.  
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Specifically, it characterizes external finance (i.e. local family-based equity, remittances, 
bank credit, business angel finance and venture capital), as opposed to internal finance (i.e. 
personal income, savings or wealth), in terms of (1) the mix of finance, business consulting and 
contacts, (2) governance mechanisms (i.e. reputational capital versus formal contracts) and (3) 
fungibility (i.e. discretion to use funds borrowed or received for alternative purposes). Drawing 
upon qualitative differences in external finance along these lines, this paper also contributes to 
the extant theoretical literature by developing a number of new propositions that link the 
financial aspects of the institutional environment to both the propensity for entrepreneurship and 
the performance of entrepreneurs in the informal economy. The outcome is what may be called a 
finance-performance nexus.   
Importantly, this paper also contributes to the extant theoretical literature by moving 
beyond the (implicit) assumption that entrepreneurs face a dichotomous decision as it relates to 
the formal and the informal economy. Specifically, it not only makes the case that entrepreneurs 
have an incentive to jointly participate in both the formal and informal economy, but also 
develops new propositions in this context. Importantly, these propositions offer new insights into 
the potential link between family-finance dependence and the propensity for tax evasion.  
More generally, the appeal of this paper is partly attributed to its empirical and policy 
relevance. Specifically, it provides a new theoretical framework that offers a new set of testable 
propositions for empirical work within the larger research agenda on entrepreneurship in the 
informal economy. Meanwhile, its contribution to public policy is demonstrated in terms of the 
clear directions and insights that it provides to policymakers as it relates to the treatment of 
informality in LAC. 
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE INFORMAL 
ECONOMY 
 
While there is disagreement over what defines entrepreneurship, this paper recognizes the 
organization of new firms as an important component. In addition, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) have a potentially important role to play. One of the salient features of the 
emerging private sector in developing countries in general, and LAC in particular, is the 
proliferation of SMEs that coexist with a few large firms (Hallberg, 2001). The ability of new 
firms and SMEs in LAC to significantly contribute to economic growth and job creation is tied in 
part to their capacity to successfully create and sell new products and services at home and 
abroad. However, financing constraints alone may preclude them from doing so (Beck and 
Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006). 
Much of the financial limitations that LAC entrepreneurs face may be generally attributed 
to financial underdevelopment in one form or another. At the macro level, for instance, it is 
understood that financial underdevelopment, as manifested in the inability of the financial 
system to mobile and efficiently allocate national savings to profitable investment opportunities, 
may constrain economic growth and prosperity (Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and Maksimovic, 2004; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; King and Levine, 1993; Jayarantne and Strahan, 1996; 
McKinnon, 1973; Rajan and Zingales, 1998).   
In LAC countries characterized by underdeveloped private and public equity markets, the 
extent to which the financial system is underperforming is partly tied to the ability of banks to 
finance new and small firms at a relatively low cost. The general view is that banks have a 
comparative advantage in small business lending; that is, they may at least partly resolve the 
informational and incentive problems normally associated with new and small firms through 
screening, contracting and monitoring over the course of the relationships that they maintain with 
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these firms (Bester, 1985; Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Diamond, 
1984, 1991; Fama, 1985; Haubrich, 1989; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 1983). However, large banks with centralized loan processing systems 
are likely to systematically under-serve the SME sector in LAC countries (Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan and Stein 2005; Stein, 2002). In addition, banks may generally ration credit to 
the most innovative young firms that tend to invest in largely intangible assets with uncertain 
future cash flow streams and liquidation values (Canepa and Stoneman, 2002; Freel, 2007; Piga 
and Atzeni, 2007). 
Equity financing is generally considered to be more ideal for new business ventures than 
debt financing. This is so because the latter may be associated with fixed payment schedules, 
restrictive covenants and collateral requirements that are not only burdensome for new business 
owners, but elevates the risk of financial distress. This partly explains why even large 
corporations may forego lucrative investments if new equity issues are underpriced in the market 
and sufficient internal finance (i.e. retained earnings) is not available to finance these 
investments (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993). Equity 
financing may be qualitatively different in terms of whether it is combined with business 
consulting and access to business networks. In fact, the success of business angel- or venture 
capital-backed new ventures is partly tied to the mix of finance, business consulting and access 
to social and business networks or contacts (Fenn, Liang and Prowse, 1997). Thus, the finance-
consulting-contacts mix of equity financing in one form or another should be considered when 
explaining the performance of entrepreneurs. 
Financial underdevelopment implies that LAC entrepreneurs may be systematically 
disadvantaged in both private debt and equity markets.  This in turn implies that their ability to 
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generally transform new ideas into new products and services may be tied to the availability of 
the internal finance (i.e. personal income, savings or wealth) and external informal finance (i.e. 
relationship- or social network-based finance), given the limited supply of what may be strictly 
characterized as external formal-informal finance in the form of bank credit, business angel 
finance and venture capital.   
We suggest that external informal finance in the form of loans from one family member 
to another, among others, qualitatively differ from external formal-informal finance along the 
following three lines: (1) finance-consulting-contacts financing mix; (2) governance mechanisms 
- the ability of individuals to make credible commitments based on reputational capital (i.e. 
where failure to honor one’s word carries shame) as opposed to formal contracts (i.e. explicitly 
stated rules and performance requirements that are independently verifiable and enforceable in a 
court of law) (North, 1993), and (3) fungibility, as defined by the extent to which the 
entrepreneur has discretion over the use of external finance.   
If new business financing from relatives is governed by reputational considerations, the 
transaction cost associated with family-based finance may be considerably lower than that of 
bank credit, business angel finance and venture capital which may be governed by relatively 
formal contracts. Thus, if the latter three sources of external finance are available to an 
entrepreneur, family-based financing may be preferred on the basis of cost considerations. But 
the appeal of family-based financing is not only limited to its (reputation-based) cost-advantage. 
Also important is its fungibility feature. For instance, an entrepreneur who receives financing 
from relatives under a reputation-governed (implicit) contract may face few, if any, binding 
restrictions on the use of funds. This is especially so if the entrepreneur directly receives funds in 
the form of cash. 
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Importantly, the attractiveness of family-based financing is a not a sufficient condition 
for entrepreneurship in the informal economy. Thus, it may be appropriate to at least analytically 
isolate the entrepreneur’s decision to use family financial resources from the decision to identify 
and exploit opportunities in the informal economy. In principle, the entrepreneur may initially 
decide to start a new business in the informal economy because of the prohibitively high 
regulatory cost of operating in the formal economy. After the decision is made to operate in the 
informal economy, the entrepreneur may seek family-based financing for the reasons noted 
above. Alternatively, given the discretion that entrepreneurs have over the use of capital 
provided by family members, family-based equity is likely to follow entrepreneurs whether they 
decide to operate in the formal economy or the informal one.  
In Webb et al. (2013: 609), the observation that entrepreneurs in the informal economy 
tend to rely on family resources is apparently reflected in the proposition that “[l]everaging 
family resources is positively related to opportunity exploitation in the informal economy…” 
However, according to our conceptual framework, it may be misleading to suggest that the use of 
family resources has a direct effect on the propensity for entrepreneurship in the informal 
economy. A positive relationship between the use of family resources and the propensity for 
entrepreneurship in the informal economy may only capture part of the potential sequence of 
decisions described above. That is, the existence of burdensome regulations may initially drive 
the entrepreneur away from the formal economy to the informal economy. Once operating in the 
latter, access to fungible (i.e. cash-based) and reputation-governed family-financing increases the 
likelihood of survival.  
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Thus, taking the entrepreneur’s participation in the informal economy as given, we depart 
from Webb et al. (2013) on the role of family resources as summarized in the following 
proposition: 
P1.  Family-based equity is positively related to the survival rate of entrepreneurs in 
the informal economy, all else equal. 
Interestingly, while family-based equity may be favored by LAC entrepreneurs on the 
grounds of reputation-based transaction cost-savings and fungibility, this type of private equity 
may be inferior to business angel financing and venture capital in terms of the composition of the 
finance-consulting-contacts mix. That is, the quality of business advice and influence of business 
contacts associated family-based equity may not be on par with either business angel financing 
or venture capital.  
While it is conceivable that the likelihood of business success or survival and 
productivity will increase if family-based equity is received from family members who become 
more business savvy and better connected, relatives that provide financing to entrepreneurs are 
less likely to be preoccupied with high-growth performance targets as business angels and 
venture capitalists. That is, the latter are expected to impose more stringent financing conditions 
that are related to a range of financial and non-financial performance measures (Fenn et al., 
1997; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001, 2003). Furthermore, business angels and venture capitalists 
are unlikely to provide financing to entrepreneurs in the informal economy since they are 
interested in firmly securing cash flow rights, among others. Given the interest of banks in 
safeguarding the assets that the entrepreneur pledges as collateral, they are also expected to 
discourage participation in the informal economy. These arguments lead to the following 
propositions: 
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P2.  The magnitude of the anticipated positive relationship between family-based 
equity and the likelihood of new business survival in the informal economy will 
increase as the business experience and the social and business network of 
relatives who provide financing increase, all else equal. 
P3.  There is a negative relationship between the share of family-based equity in total 
external finance and the productivity of new businesses; however, the magnitude 
of this negative relationship will decline as relatives who provide financing gain 
more business knowledge and become better connected in social and business 
networks, all else equal. 
P4.  The growth rate of new firms in the informal economy is negatively related to the 
share of family-based equity in total external finance; and the magnitude of this 
negative relationship will not systematically decline as the relatives who provide 
financing gain business experience and access to larger social and business 
networks, all else equal. 
P5.  The propensity for entrepreneurship in the informal economy is negatively related 
to the share of bank credit, business angel finance and venture capital in total 
external finance, all else equal. 
In LAC countries, local entrepreneurs may access family-based equity from relatives at 
home and abroad. Remittances constitute an example of the latter. At the end of 2012, the value 
of remittance flows to LAC stood at US$61.3 billion after reaching a peak of US$64.9 billion in 
the run-up to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (Maldonado and  Hayem 2013). Remittances 
are primarily predicated on the needs that the potential recipient articulate to the sender. While 
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the potential recipient may request funds to purchase food, cover housing costs and medical 
costs, there are times when a request might be made for funds to start a new business venture.  
Remittances may be favored over bank credit by enterprising individuals in LAC 
countries. Similar to the case of family-based equity, remittances are preferred because they may 
be secured at a low transaction cost; that is, the relative abroad may be willing to send the 
requested funds to the potential dependent-recipient who is known to be truthful about his or her 
financial circumstances. Like family-based financing, remittance is also fungible; that is, once 
the requested funds are received, the recipient has the discretion to use them for purposes other 
than those initially stated. Thus, remittances may follow the recipient who intends to participate 
in the informal economy.  
For all these reasons, the remittance-recipient status of individuals in LAC countries is 
important when evaluating the propensity for entrepreneurship in the informal economy. 
Remittance-recipient status, as defined by a binary variable with value one if the individual 
receives remittance and zero otherwise, and the propensity for entrepreneurship in the informal 
economy may be summarized as follows: 
P6.  The propensity for entrepreneurship in the informal economy is positively related 
to the remittance-recipient status of the individual, all else equal. 
Insofar as remittances constitute a more distant form of family-based financing (i.e. 
distant family-based equity), it may be inferior relative to capital raised from relatives at home in 
terms of timeliness and the consistency of the business support provided. In addition, since 
relatives abroad may be less connected with the local business community, they may not be well-
placed to connect remittance-recipient entrepreneurs relative to locally based influential family 
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members. Altogether, remittance may constitute finance with limited business advice and 
contacts relative to family-based financing received at home. This leads to the following 
propositions:  
P7.  The survival rate of new firms in the informal economy is negatively related to 
the remittance-recipient status of their owners, all else equal. 
P8.  The productivity of new firms in the informal economy is negatively related to the 
remittance-recipient status of their owners, all else equal. 
Extension of the Finance-Performance Nexus Framework 
In the foregoing conceptualization of entrepreneurship in the informal economy, we make 
an implicit assumption that enterprising individuals start new businesses either in the formal 
economy or the informal economy. In game theoretic language, such a dichotomy is equivalent 
to the assumption that entrepreneurs adopt a “pure strategy”. However, for both theoretical and 
practical reasons a pure strategy may not serve entrepreneurs well. For instance, prominent 
entrepreneurs that exclusively operate in the informal economy are unlikely to escape the 
scrutiny of tax authorities over an extended period.  However, the informal operations of such an 
entrepreneur may largely go unnoticed if he or she simultaneously operates in the formal and the 
informal economy. In game theoretic language, a “mix strategy” approach to informality may be 
superior to a pure strategy.  
There is a potentially significant group of what may be called formal-informal 
entrepreneurs that straddle the line between the formal and the informal economy (Godrey, 
2011; Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, Ostrom, 2006). While a complete treatment of these 
entrepreneurs is beyond the scope of this paper, a basic understanding of the relationship 
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between their allocation decisions and their primary source of external finance may shed light on 
the vexing issue of tax evasion.  
In theory, the share of activities that entrepreneurs allocate to the informal economy may 
be related to the source of external finance upon which they primarily depend.  Specifically, 
since banks, business angels and venture capitalists are expected to screen and closely monitor 
the new firms that they finance, the latter’s share of activities in the informal economy is likely 
to be limited, if any. This leads to the following proposition: 
 P9.  The share of revenue generated or costs incurred by entrepreneurs in the informal 
economy is negatively related to the share of bank credit, business angel finance 
and venture capital in total external finance, all else equal. 
While entrepreneurs who primarily receive formal external finance may be prohibited 
from participating in the informal economy, the situation may be fundamentally different for 
those who are dependent on family-based equity. Specifically, the latter are expected to have 
considerable autonomy as it relates to simultaneous participation in the formal and informal 
economy. The latter may also have considerable discretion over the reporting of revenue and 
costs. Insofar as participation in the formal and informal economy is motivated by tax 
considerations, the relationship between the dependence on family-based equity and the share of 
activities in the informal economy may be summarized by the following two propositions: 
P10.  The share of revenues generated by entrepreneurs in the informal economy is 
positively related to the share of family-based equity in total external finance, all 
else equal. 
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P11.  The share of costs incurred by entrepreneurs in the informal economy is 
negatively related to the share of family-based equity in total external finance, all 
else equal. 
According to propositions 9 and 10, family-finance dependent entrepreneurs that 
jointly operate in the formal and the informal economy may minimize their tax liability 
by shifting profits to the informal economy while reporting losses in the formal economy. 
DISCUSSION  
Summary of Key Concepts and Analytical Results 
This paper develops a number of new propositions that constitute what may be 
collectively called the finance-performance nexus of the institutional framework of Webb et al. 
(2013). This is done in the context of LAC, and is primarily geared toward helping scholars and 
policymakers better understand the variety of institutional factors that not only foster or 
discourage entrepreneurship in the informal economy, but also account for performance 
differences across entrepreneurs in the informal economy.  
Given the importance of institutional heterogeneity as a source of cross-sectional 
differences in performance, the conceptualization of external finance is among the key 
contributions that this paper makes to the extant theoretical literature. Given limited internal 
finance, the basic argument is that LAC entrepreneurs may be dependent on external informal 
finance (i.e. local family-based equity, distant family-based equity or remittances) relative to 
external formal-informal finance (i.e. business angel finance and venture capital). These sources 
of external finance differ in terms of: (1) finance-consulting-contacts mix (2) governance 
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mechanisms (i.e. reputational capital versus formal contracts), and (3) fungibility (i.e. discretion 
to use funds borrowed or received for alternative purposes).  
In general, it is argued that the preference for external (relationship-based) informal 
finance, whether in the form of local or distant family-based equity, is predicated on the 
relatively low transaction costs that are associated with reputation-based governance mechanisms 
as opposed to formal contracts. Meanwhile, it is proposed that productivity and the growth or 
survival rates of new firms in the informal economy may be determined in part by the extent to 
which business advice and contacts accompany family-based equity. In particular, while 
financing from more business savvy and well-connected family members may improve the 
productivity and the likelihood of survival of entrepreneurs in the informal economy, it is 
unlikely to lead to rapid business expansion. 
The relationship between family-based equity and the propensity for entrepreneurship in 
the informal economy receives special treatment in this paper. Specifically, it treats the decision 
to enter the informal economy separately from the decision to use family-based finance. It is 
possible, for instance, that the regulatory costs of operating in the formal economy may 
encourage entrepreneurs to start new ventures in the informal economy. Once there, the 
entrepreneur then decides whether to use family-based finance or external finance in the form of 
bank credit, business angel finance or venture capital. Since family-based equity is likely to be 
more fungible than these alternative sources external finance, an entrepreneur is likely to favor 
the former over the latter.  
At the same time, it is plausible that the entrepreneur enters the informal economy 
knowing fully well that it is always possible to raise capital from family members if banks refuse 
to lend to informal business owners. While this alternative case raises the question of whether 
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family-based finance follows or leads entrepreneurs in the informal economy, it highlights 
another aspect of the fungibility of external (relationship-based) informal finance. That is, insofar 
as fungibility confers discretion over the use of funds borrowed or received, the value of this 
flexibility is enhanced by the relative ease with which family-based equity and remittances in the 
form of cash may be moved between the formal and the informal economy. 
Finally, an implicit assumption behind our theoretical framework is that an entrepreneur 
must decide whether to start a new business venture either in the formal economy or the informal 
economy. However, when our theoretical framework is extended to account for a potentially 
more practical setting where (formal-informal) entrepreneurs operate in both the formal and the 
informal economy at the same time, a number of insights emerge. On the one hand, the use of 
relatively formal (contract-governed) finance (i.e. bank credit, business angel finance and 
venture capital) may reduce informality by limiting the ability of entrepreneurs to operate in the 
informal economy. On the other hand, entrepreneurs who get most of their external finance from 
their relatives are not only better placed to simultaneously operate in the formal and the informal 
economy, but may also have greater latitude to manipulate their financial records and engage in 
tax evasion. 
Implications for Empirical Work and Public Policy 
The finance-performance nexus provides a basis for a theoretically grounded empirical 
investigation of the relationship between the financial aspects of the institutional environment 
and both the propensity for entrepreneurship and the performance of entrepreneurs in the 
informal economy. It also provides a basis for conceptualizing how policymakers may prudently 
approach the challenge of informality in LAC countries. According to our theoretical framework, 
the approach to informality may be summarized in the following two steps.  
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First, policymakers should initially focus on reducing the relative size of the informal 
economy. At the same time, it should be appreciated that the optimal share of informality in the 
economy is not zero. For instance, even if business regulations were the sole impediments to 
entrepreneurship in the formal economy, there is conceivably some point where an incremental 
relaxation of those regulations may result in an increase in risk (i.e. increase in the share of 
defective and unsafe products in total sales) and business malpractices (i.e. money laundering or 
fraud). The expected incremental costs from these outcomes may exceed the expected economic 
benefits (i.e. new jobs, productivity growth and additional tax revenue) that may be derived from 
the entry of an additional new firm in the formal economy. In other words, it may not be prudent 
to eliminate business regulations that originally came into being to prevent unscrupulous 
business owners from defrauding their customers, investors and the tax authorities.  
Still, regulations that are initially introduced to address a particular concern may 
subsequently take on a life of their own. The outcome may be a complex set of burdensome 
business regulations that discourage enterprising individuals from formally registering their new 
businesses. There is almost certainly room in this case to relax business regulations. The 
institutional impediments that seem to require the most urgent attention in LAC countries include 
business registration procedures, taxation, bureaucracy and corruption.  
Once efforts have been made along these lines to optimally restrict the size of the 
informal economy, the next step is to examine how best to improve the productivity of the new 
and incumbent firms that are expected to remain in the informal economy. Specifically, the 
relatively scarce resources in LAC countries are perhaps best utilized if policymakers 
concentrate on the institutional factors that are likely to have the most adverse effects on the 
productivity of new and incumbent businesses in the informal economy. Our theoretical 
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framework suggests that the potentially limited business experience and social network that may 
be associated with family-based financing may be good enough to keep new businesses afloat in 
the informal economy; however, they are likely to operate unproductively.  
One way to address the inadequacy of family-based equity is to generally provide 
business training and other related-support services to entrepreneurs with ties to family-run 
businesses. But as our theoretical framework suggests, it may be necessary to provide a similar 
range of services to working-age remittance-recipients as well. These services may be designed 
and appropriately delivered through a private-public partnership. 
Finally, there is much to be gained from greater efforts aimed at improving the 
information architecture that is required by banks to cost-effectively serve the SME sector in 
LAC countries. As a matter of priority, efforts should be made to develop or expand credit 
bureaus on a scale that enables them to generate and maintain credit histories on individuals in 
both rural and urban areas. The availability of this type of financial information may not only 
lower the cost of small business lending, but also reduce the degree to which new and small 
businesses are credit rationed in LAC countries (Berger, Frame, Miller, 2005).  
Moreover, insofar as financial reforms increase the role of banks in new and small 
business financing, not only are informality and tax evasion expected to diminish according to 
our theoretical framework, but firm performance and labor productivity are also expected to 
improve. Similar benefits are expected as private equity (i.e. business angel finance and venture 
capital) become a more important source of new and small business financing in LAC. Thus, the 
development of the debt and equity markets is a critical component of the broader set of financial 
reforms that are imperative in LAC. 
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CONCLUSION 
Altogether, this paper provides a theoretical basis for scholars and policymakers to think 
more clearly and logically about both the financial and non-financial aspects of the institutional 
environment; and how they may be related to the decisions of enterprising individuals to either 
fully operate in the informal economy, or straddle the line between the informal and the formal 
economy. In addition, it is now possible to think about performance differences among 
entrepreneurs in the informal economy in a structured way. When the new insights and 
propositions in this paper are combined with those in the extant theoretical framework, scholars 
and policymakers have a solid platform to not only empirically evaluate both the financial and 
non-financial determinants of the propensity for entrepreneurship and performance in the 
informal economy, but to also formulate coherent public policies that are effective in both 
restraining and coping with informality. 
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